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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Billy Raymond Shearin appeals from the district court's denial of his petition for 
post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In its Order Re: Hearing on Petition Held May 1, 2013, the district court described 
the facts and proceedings of Shearin's underlying criminal case as follows: 
On December 15, 2011, [Shearin] following a plea of guilty was 
sentenced to 10 years in prison with 31/ 2 years fixed and 61/ 2 years 
indeterminate, for the crime of Burglary, a felony. . . . In return for his 
plea of guilty, the state dismissed five other charges against [Shearin] 
which included two additional counts of Burglary and three counts of petit 
theft. Upon conviction, [Shearin] could have received sentences of up to 
23 years of incarceration and $103,000.00 in fines on the dismissed 
counts. No appeal was filed in the case. At the times relevant to 
[Shearin's] claim that evidence in this case was illegally obtained, he was 
on parole in Ada County case number H0600597, subject to the terms of a 
parole agreement reproduced as defendant's exhibit "A" admitted at the 
hearing on the petition. Condition number 8 of this agreement states that 
"Parolee will submit to a search of person or property, to include residence 
and vehicle, at any time and place by any agent of Field and Community 
Services and s/he does waive [sic] constitutional right to be free from such 
searching." 
(R., p.74.)1 
On February 21, 2012, Shearin filed a petition for post-conviction relief (R., pp.4-
8), and the court appointed counsel (R., pp.27-29) who filed an amended petition 
presenting two ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims: (1) failure "to file a motion 
1 References to page numbers are based on the numbers appearing on the Adobe 
Reader pdf. format of the Clerk's Record. 
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suppress evidence obtained from a search of his vehicle by Boise police that yielded 
incriminating evidence[,]" based on Shearin's contention that his parole agreement only 
authorized a parole officer to conduct such a search, and (2) failure to file a notice of 
appeal upon Shearin's request (R., pp.35-39, 74-75). After the court set an evidentiary 
hearing date (R., p.63), the state filed an Answer (R., pp.69-72). The court detailed the 
facts presented at the hearing as follows: 
... The charges ... stemmed from the theft of high-end athletic 
apparel from a Fred Meyer store located on West Franklin and Overland 
Road in Boise, Idaho. On June 21, 2011, Boise police responded to a call 
from a loss prevention manager at the store's location. [Tr., p.82, Ls.8-
25.] The manager had spotted Mr. Shearin in the store and, believing him 
to be involved in a series of thefts from Fred Meyer stores in other 
locations as well, called Boise police to alert them to his presence. [Tr., 
p.82, L.18 - p.85, L.17.J 
When officers arrived, Mr. Shearin was seen exiting onto and 
across Orchard Street without stopping at a stop sign. In the course of the 
resulting traffic stop, officers discovered that Mr. Shearin was driving on a 
suspended license and arrested him. [Tr., p.85, L.25 - p.87, L.12; p.100, 
Ls.2-5.] Officers also learned that he was on parole, and contacted Mr. 
Bill Rowen, a supervisor at the Department of Probation and Parole, who 
in turn directed parole agent Layla Jeffries to respond to the location 
where the petitioner and his vehicle were located. [Tr., p.10, L.14 - p.11, 
L.4; p.20, L.25 - p.22, L.3.] 
As stated, condition eight of the petitioner's conditions of parole, 
which he had initialed and signed in front of a notary on or about 
November 5, 2009, provides that "Parolee will submit to a search of 
person or property, to include residence or vehicle, at any time and place 
by any agent of Field and Community Services, and s/he does waive [sic] 
Constitutional right to be free from such searching." [Tr., p.12, L.20 - p.19, 
L.3.] See Petitioner's Ex. "A". It is agreed in this case that the responding 
parole agent dispatched to the scene by the supervisor was agent Layla 
Jeffries, and that while on route, she authorized Boise police to conduct 
the search of the vehicle pending her arrival at the scene. [Tr., p.87, 
Ls.17-25; p.98, L.18 - p.99, L.17.] It is undisputed that Ms. Jeffries was 
not the agent regularly assigned to the petitioner, but was dispatched by 
the on-duty supervisor because the petitioner's regular agent, Ms. Rhoda 
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Faust, was attending a training program at the time. [Tr., p.8, L.15 - p.11, 
L.8.] 
Ms. Jeffries arrived at the scene after the search of the vehicle was 
begun, but before it was completed. [Tr., p.24, L.1 - p.25, L.3; p.98, L.18 -
p.99, L.6.] She recalled seeing a duffel bag discovered by the police with 
what appeared to be stolen clothing in the trunk, but could not recall 
whether the trunk was open when she arrived. [Tr., p.23, L.21 - p.25, L.8.] 
As a result of this discovery, Ms. Jeffries went with Boise police to the 
defendant's residence, and conducted a further search there. [Tr., p.25, L. 
9 - p.26, L.1.] Ms. Jeffries did participate in this search, but concedes that 
Boise police did the majority of the searching while she remained with the 
petitioner. [Tr., p.25, L.20 - p.26, L.1.] She further testified that in 
accordance with her usual practice in similar situations, she would have 
conducted the search of the petitioner's house whether the officers had 
suggested it or not. [Tr., p.26, L.13- p.27, L.17.] 
Out of the preceding facts, the only significant conflicting testimony 
was between an officer of the Boise police, who believed that Ms. Jeffries 
requested the search to be started while she was on her way to the scene 
[Tr., p.87, Ls.17-25; p.98, L.18 - p.99, L.12], and another officer who 
stated that the on-duty supervisor for the department of Probation and 
Parole had advised him that Boise police could search on behalf of the 
department while the supervisor arranged for a parole agent to come to 
the scene [Tr., p.109, L.1 - p.110, L.19]. As to the petitioner's claims that 
Ms. Comstock failed to file a direct appeal and a motion under Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 when asked to do so, the facts are not as clear. The 
petitioner states that he requested an appeal be filed. [Tr., p.40, L.10 -
p.42, L.3.J Ms. Comstock testified that she recalls no such request, and 
that given the absence of any notation in her file that such a request had 
been made, she did not believe it had been made. [Tr., p.59, L.12 - p.63, 
L.11; p.77, L.15 - p.79, L.21.] She further testified that had the petitioner 
clearly requested an appeal, her practice was to have the paralegal 
prepare the notice for filing immediately upon leaving the courtroom 
following sentencing, and that did not happen here. [Id.] The defendant 
further stated that he tried to call Ms. Comstock several times to discuss 
an appeal with her, but could not get in touch with her. [Tr., p.43, Ls.15-
21; p.124, L.24 - p.125, L.24.] He admits, however, that he left no 
messages on these occasions. [Tr., p.126, L.23 - p.127, L.11.J 
(R., pp.76-77 (supplemented with bracketed references to the record).) 
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After the evidentiary hearing, the district court entered a written decision denying 
Shearin's claims. 2 (R., pp.73-95.) First, the court concluded that the stop of Shearin's 
by law enforcement was justified because there was reason believe Shearin 
was involved in "the illegal activity of burglary and theft from Fred Meyer stores based 
upon the statements made to them by the loss prevention manager[,]" and Shearin "had 
violated a traffic law due to the 'California stop' observed by the officer." (R., pp.89-90.) 
In regard to the search of Shearin's vehicle, the district court concluded that the 
police who conducted the search "were acting as 'agents' of Field and Community 
Services pursuant to the search condition in [Shearin's) parole agreement, of which he 
was fully aware[,]" and it was irrelevant "that the search was commenced by police prior 
to the probation officer's arrival on the scene." (R., pp.90-91.) As an alternative basis 
justifying the search of Shearin's vehicle, the court held that, after stopping Shearin's 
vehicle for a traffic violation, and "upon seeing apparel in plain view inside the vehicle 
consistent with information provided to police by Fred Meyer, police had reasonable 
suspicion and/or probable cause to search the rest of the vehicle for further evidence 
consistent with the reported thefts irrespective of [Shearin's] Fourth Amendment waiver 
under the 'automobile exception' to the search warrant requirement." (R., p.91.) 
Lastly, the district court held that Shearin failed to show he made an unequivocal 
request to his trial counsel to file an appeal, and therefore failed to meet his burden to 
2 The district court explained that, although not included as a claim in Shearin's 
amended petition, based on the consent of the parties at the evidentiary hearing, the 
court also considered Shearin's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
file a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. (R., p.73.) At the conclusion of the 
evidentiary hearing, the court denied that claim, explaining that, because it would not 
have reduced Shearin's sentences if a Rule 35 motion had been filed, trial counsel was 
Rot ineffective for failing to file such a motion. (R., p.75; Tr., p.143, L.17-p.145, L.18.) 
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Shearin states issues on appeal as: 
Did the District Court err when it 
Relief? 
Was the Office of the State Appellate Defender ineffective when it did not 
litigate to this Court [sic] claims of ineffective assistance of counsel? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.10.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 




Shearin Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief 
Introduction 
Shearin appeals the district court's denial of his post-conviction claims -- that his 
trial counsel's performance was constitutionally ineffective because she failed to file a 
motion to suppress evidence resulting from the stop and search of Shearin's vehicle, 
and failed to file a notice of appeal. (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-20.) Shearin additionally 
argues, "the office of the State Appellate Defender was ineffective for not litigating these 
claims on appeal."3 (Appellant's Brief, p.21 (capitalization modified).) 
A review of the record and applicable legal standards confirms that Shearin failed 
to meet his burden to prove his allegations, and the district court correctly denied his 
claims. Shearin's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a suppression 
motion fails because there was no valid legal basis to file such a motion, therefore trial 
counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to do so. In regard to trial counsel's 
alleged failure to file an appeal at Shearin's request, Shearin essentially asks this Court 
to second-guess the district court's credibility determinations, contrary to established 
standards of review. Finally, Shearin's contention that his former counsel in this appeal 
provided ineffective assistance is not a viable claim because that claim has not been 
preserved for appeal because it has not been presented, much less decided, by the 
3 This Court previously granted a motion by the Office of the State Appellate Defender 
to withdraw from representing Shearin in this appeal. (See 3/14/14 Order Granting 
Motion for Leave to Withdraw and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule.) 
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court; moreover, there is no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel 
a post-conviction proceeding. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which his claim is based. I.C.R. 
57(c); Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986). A trial court's 
decision that the petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight. 
Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990). Where the 
district court conducts a hearing and enters findings of fact and conclusions of law, an 
appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, but will 
freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the district court from those facts. Mitchell 
v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998). The credibility of the 
witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn 
from the evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district court. 
Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003). 
C. Shearin Failed To Show That His Trial Counsel's Performance Was 
Constitutionally Ineffective 
A petitioner seeking relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must 
prove "that his counsel was deficient in his performance and that this deficiency resulted 
in prejudice." Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ct. App. 
1992) (citing State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 776 P.2d 424 (1989)). To establish 
deficient performance the petitioner must overcome a strong presumption that counsel 
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petiormed within the wide range of professional assistance by proving trial counsel's 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. State v. Shackelford, 150 
355, 382, 247 582, 609 (201 , Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 
P.2d 283,286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406,775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. 
App. 1989). To meet this burden "requires showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must prove a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's deficient petiormance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,761,760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger v. 
State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). Specifically, in order to 
prove the prejudice prong of the Strickland test where the petitioner alleges counsel 
failed to inform him of a plea offer, he must prove there was a reasonable probability he 
would have accepted the offer. Piro v. State, 146 Idaho 86, 94, 190 P.3d 905, 913 (Ct. 
App. 2008). 
The district court utilized these standards in analyzing Shearin's claims, and 
relied on its own credibility determinations in concluding that Shearin failed to show 
either that his appointed counsel was deficient, or that he suffered prejudice from any 
deficiency. (R., pp.78-94.) Application of the correct legal standards to the evidence 
presented demonstrates the district court did not err in denying Shearin's post-
conviction claims. Shearin's argument that the district court erred in denying his two 
post-conviction claims is completely rebutted by the district court's "Order Re: Hearing 
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on Petition Held May 1, 2013" (R., pp.73-95), attached as Appendix which is 
incorporated into this Respondent's Brief and relied upon as if fully set forth herein. 
The state makes the following argument as a supplement to the district court's 
well-reasoned analysis in regard to Shearin's suppression-based ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel claim. On appeal, Shearin contends, as he did below, that "the waiver 
he signed only authorized his parole officer to conduct such searches, and was not able 
to be transferred to another person or agency without the consent of the 
Appellant/Petitioner." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Paragraph 8 of Shearin's parole-
agreement waiver in this case stated: 
Parolee will submit to a search of person or property, to include residence 
and vehicle, at any time and place by any agent of Field and Community 
Services and s/he does waive [sic] constitutional right to be free from such 
searching. 
(Def. Ex. A) Shearin agreed to this term of the parole-agreement, thereby agreeing 
that he had no Fourth Amendment right to be free from a search "by any agent of Field 
and Community Services." The district court held: 
While condition eight of the petitioner's parole agreement refers only to 
agents of Field and Community Services, the term 'agent' is undefined and 
. . . the Court believes it should be read to allow law enforcement 
personnel acting on the authority of Field and Community Services to 
conduct the searches contemplated by that condition, as was the case 
here. Idaho law requires terms not defined to be given their everyday 
meaning as commonly understood. I.C. § 73-113. State v. Morris, 28 
Idaho 599, 155 P. 296 (1916). 
(R., pp.90-91.) 
According to the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, an agent is "a person who 
does business for another person: a person who acts on behalf of another." Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary 2014. http://www.merriam-webster.com (8/14/04). The 
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parole officer in this case authorized Boise City Police Officers to act in her place in 
conducting a search of Shearin's vehicle. This is the very definition of an agent. The 
that the parole did not personally attend search is of no constitutional 
significance. Cf. United States v. Richardson, 849 F.2d 439, 442 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting 
that requiring the probation officer's physical presence during every probation search 
would unnecessarily interfere with the twin goals of probation: rehabilitation of the 
probationer and protection of society), overruled on other grounds by United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S.112, 121-22 (2001). 
Shearin has failed to show any error in the district court's analysis and conclusion 
that, under the everyday meaning as commonly understood, the police officers were 
acting as agents of the parole officer when they searched Shearin's vehicle pursuant to 
the parole officer's authorization. 
Moreover, even without Shearin's signed conditions of parole, the search of his 
vehicle by police officers was justified. Parolees and probationers enjoy a reduced 
expectation of privacy against governmental intrusion. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 
843 (2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001 ). The United States Supreme 
Court has held that probationers and parolees, due to their status as such, have a 
diminished expectation of privacy for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. United 
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). The Idaho Supreme Court recognized this 
same diminished expectation of privacy in State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 843, 736 
P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987), stating: "persons conditionally released to societies have a 
reduced expectation of privacy, thereby rendering intrusions by government authorities 
'reasonable' which otherwise would be unreasonable or invalid under traditional 
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constitutional concepts." Applying this principle to the police search of Shearin's vehicle 
-- at the request of the parole officer -- supports the conclusion that the search was not 
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court's opinion in Samson v. California, 
(2006), is instructive. 
U.S. 843 
In Samson, the Court "granted certiorari to decide whether a suspicionless 
search, conducted under the authority [of a statute authorizing a search without a 
warrant or probable cause], violates the Constitution." 547 U.S. at 846. The Court held 
"it does not." kl In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted its prior conclusion in 
Knights that probationers and parolees have a diminished expectation of privacy. kl at 
847-849. The Court reasoned: 
As we noted in Knights, parolees are on the "continuum" of state-
imposed punishments. On this continuum, parolees have fewer 
expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to 
imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment. As this Court has 
pointed out, parole is an established variation on imprisonment of 
convicted criminals . . .. The essence of parole is release from prison, 
before the completion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abide 
by certain rules during the balance of the sentence. In most cases, the 
State is willing to extend parole only because it is able to condition it upon 
compliance with certain requirements. 
The extent and reach of [California's] parole conditions clearly 
demonstrate that parolees ... have severely diminished expectations of 
privacy by virtue of their status alone. 
Samson, 547 U.S. at 850 (citations and quotations omitted). 
Based upon a parolee's reduced expectation of privacy and the state's interests 
in the ability to regulate those released on parole, the Court in Samson concluded that 
"[i]mposing a reasonable suspicion requirement" on the ability to search a parolee 
"would give parolees greater opportunity to anticipate searches and conceal criminality." 
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Samson, 547 U.S. 854. Accordingly, the Court held "that the Fourth Amendment 
not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee." 
Although Samson involved actions taken pursuant to a statute that permitted 
suspicionless searches, the holding of the case stands for the broader proposition that 
such searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment. 547 U.S. at 856. It logically 
follows from this holding that police officers could do precisely what they did in this case 
without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment, i.e., search the vehicle belonging to 
Shearin, who was on parole, without any suspicion whatsoever.4 Indeed, police officers 
exceeded this minimum standard by virtue of their knowledge that Shearin was, as 
reported by the loss prevention manager from Fred Meyer, likely engaged in criminal 
activity -- namely burglary. Therefore, even though a suspicionless search would have 
been legally justified on the sole fact that Shearin was a parolee, the officers had a 
reasonable basis, if not a "reasonable suspicion," for searching Shearin's vehicle. 
Because the search of Shearin's vehicle was constitutionally permissible, he has 
failed to show he is entitled to suppression of any evidence found as a result of that 
search. 
4 Shearin's complaint that the district court cited cases involving probation instead of 
parole does not benefit his position. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.13-15.) As explained in 
Samson, "[o]n this continuum, parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than 
probationers, because parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to 
imprisonment." 547 U.S. at 850. 
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Shearin's Claim That The SAPD Was Ineffective For Withdrawing From 
Representing Him In This Appeal Is Not Properly Before The Court And 
Otherwise Lacks Merit 
Shearin's argument that provided ineffective assistance by 
withdrawing from this appeal is not properly before the Court and otherwise lacks merit. 
(See Appellant's Brief, p.21.) 
First, Shearin's claim that the SAPD provided ineffective assistance by 
withdrawing its representation of him in this appeal is unpreserved because he has 
never presented it to the district court. It is well settled that issues not raised below will 
generally not be considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 
879, 888-89, 136 P.3d 350, 359-60 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 
195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). It is also well settled "that in order for an issue to be 
raised on appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling which forms the basis for an 
assignment of error." State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 585, 199 P.3d 155, 160 (Ct. 
App. 2008); State v. Grube, 126 Idaho 377, 387, 883 P.2d 1069, 1079 (1994) (citing 
State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 942, 946 (1993); Dunlick, Inc. v. Utah-
Idaho Concrete Pipe Co., 77 Idaho 499, 502, 295 P.2d 700, 702 (1956)). 
It is Shearin's burden to adequately raise, in the district court, his claim that the 
SAPD provided ineffective assistance by withdrawing from this appeal, and to obtain an 
adverse ruling before presenting it on appeal. Because Shearin has not presented his 
claim in the district court, he has failed to preserve it on appeal. 
Second, in Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), the Idaho 
Supreme Court acknowledged that in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991 ), 
the United States Supreme Court ruled, in the context of a federal habeas corpus claim, 
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because is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction 
" "a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel 
proceedings." Consistent with Coleman, the Idaho Supreme Court held: "we do 
not recognize an independent right to effective assistance of counsel during post-
conviction proceedings." Murphy, 156 Idaho at_, 327 P.3d at 372. inasmuch as the 
Idaho Supreme Court does "not recognize an independent right to effective assistance 
of counsel during post-conviction proceedings," id., Shearin's argument that the SAPD 
provided ineffective assistance in this appeal is not a viable claim. 
Shearin has failed to show error in the district court's decision denying post-
conviction relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
denying Shearin's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 19th day of August, 2014. 
J~J4N C. McKINNE 
de'puty Attorney Ge 
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TI-IE DISTRlCT COURT Tiffi FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
. . ~ D. ~ 
OF TI-IE STATE OF IDAHO, IN' A.ND FOR TIIB COUNIT OF ADA. .BJDWII~ 
BILLY RA YMOl'-.TD SHEARIN, ) 
) Case No. CV-PC-2012-03004 
Petitioner, ) 
J. ORDER RE: HEARING ON PETITION 
vs. ) HELD MAY 1, 2013 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent ) _______________ ) 
Presently before the Court is Mr. Shearin's petition for post-conviction relief, filed on 
February 21, 2012, and amended on August 30, 2012. On May 1, 2013, an evidentiary hearing 
was held on each of Mr. Shearin's claims for ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, Ms. 
Danica Comstock, in Ada County case number CR-FE-2011-009397. Specifically, Mr. Shearin 
alleges that Ms. Comstock rendered ineffective assistance by I) failing to seek suppression of 
certain evidence; 2) failing to file an appeal when asked to do so; and 3) failing to file a Rule 35 
motion when asked to do so. 1 Upon a favorable resolution of his claims, Mr. Shearin is seeking 
reinstatement of his appeal rights and whatever other relief this Court feels is appropriate. The 
Court denied the Rule 3 5 claim from the bench on the ground that it would not have granted such 
a motion even had it been filed, and took the remaining two issues under advisement Having 
now fully considered· the record, testimony, and arguments submitted by both sides, the Court . . . 
issues the following mepiorandum decision and order for judgment in favor of the respondent on 
both of the remaining claims. 
1· Only the first two of these claims actually appear in the petitioner's amended 
petition; the Rule 35 claim, however, was tried by ~onsent at the evidentiary hearing • 
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I. BACKGROIJND 
On December 15, 2011, the petitioner follow.ng a plea of guilty was sentenced to 10 
years in prison with 3 ½ years fixed and 6 ½ years indeterminate, for the crime of Burglary, a 
felony. He was given 178 days of credit for time served. In return for his plea of guilty, the state 
dismissed five other charges against the petitioner which included two additional counts of 
Burglary and three counts of petit theft. Upon conviction, the petitioner could have received 
sentences ofup to 23 years of incarceration and $103,000.00 in fines on the dismissed counts. 
No appeal was filed in the case. At the times relevant to the petitioner's claim that evidence in 
this case was illegally obtained, he was on parole in Ada County case number HO6OO597, subject 
to the terms of a parole agreement reproduced as defendant's exhibit "A" admitted at the hearing 
on the petition. Condition number 8 of this agreement states that "Parolee ""'ill submit to a search 
of person or property, to include residence and vehicle, at any time and place by any agent of 
Field and Community Services and s/be does waive constitutional right to be free from such 
searching." 
Qn or about February 21, 2012, the petitioner filed this petition for post-conviction relief 
pro se, asserting the aforementioned two instances of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. 
For his first claim, he asserts that trial counsel was deficient in that she failed to file a motion to 
suppress evidence obtained from a search of his vehicle by Boise police that yielded 
incriminating evidence. More specifically, he argues that although the search was ostensibly 
justified pursuant to the terms of his parole, those terms did not authorize such a search except by 
the parole officer assigned to him, or at least by a parole officer acting in that officer's stead-yet 
police began searching his vehicle pursuant to condition 8 prior to the arrival of any 
representative of Field and Community Services at the scene of the search. The petitioner further 
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asserts that while a parole officer was in fact present at a subsequent search of his home which 
uncovered further incriminating evidence, the subsequent search was tainted by the earlier illegal 
search of the vehicle, which led to the search of his home.2 
For bis second claim, the petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was deficient in that she 
failed to file a notice of appeal on his behalf despite his request that she do so. He further asserts 
that he attempted to call his counsei to clarify the status of his appeal but was unable to contact 
her. 
On March 12, 2012, the Court appointed counsel to assist the petitioner, and on March 
14, 2012, :Mr. John Defranco entered an appearance as conflicts counsel on the petitioner's 
behalf. An amended petition was filed on the petitioner's behalf on August 30, 2012, and the 
state answered on April 18, 2013, denying the petitioner's claims but admitting that Boise police 
did search the petitioner's vehicle prior to the arrival of a representative of the Department of 
Probation and Parole at the scene of the search, and that a subsequent search of the defendant's 
home was conducted \\<1th a representative of the Department of Probation and Parole present. 
The state further admitted that trial counsel failed to file a notice of appeal, but denied the 
petitioner's claim that he directed her to do so. The state sought a denial of all claims contained 
in the petition or dismissal of the claims. 
The Court then set the matter for evidentiary hearing, which took place as scheduled on 
May 1, 2013. At the hearing, the Court denied an additional claim for ineffective assistance of 
counsel (arising from counsel's alleged failure to file a Rule 35 motion when asked to do so) 
from the bench, taking the two issues outlined above tmder advisement. 
2 Tbe state has not rai~ed tbe inevitable discovery doctrine in opposition to tbe 
motion, so the Court will not address it here. 
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Facts presented at the bearing. The facts involved in this case are not substantially in 
dispute. The charges summarized above stemmed from the theft of high-end athletic apparel 
from a Fred Meyer store located on West Franklin and Overland Road in Boise, Idaho. On June 
21, 2011, Boise police responded to a call from a loss prevention manager at the store's location. 
The manager had spotted Mr. Shearin in the store and, believing him _to be involved in a series 
of thefts from Fred Meyer stores in other locations as well, called Boise police to alert them to 
bis presence. 
When officers arrived, Mr. Shearin was seen exiting onto and across Orchard Street 
without stopping at a stop sign. In the course of the resulting traffic stop, officers discovered that 
Mr. Shearin was driving on a suspended license and arrested him. Officers also learned thathe 
was on parole, and contacted Mr. Bill Rowen, a supervisor at the Department of Probation and 
Parole, who in turn directed parole agent Layla Jeffries to respond to the location where the 
petitioner and bis vehicle were located. 
As stated, condition eight of the petitioner's conditions of parole, which he had initialed 
and signed in front of a notary on or about November 5, 2009, provides that "Parolee will submit 
to a search of person or property, to include residence or vehicle, at any time and place by any 
agent of Field and Community Services, and s/he does waive Constitutional right to be free from 
such searching." See Petitioner's Ex. "A". It is agreed in this case that the responding parole 
agent dispatched to the scene by the supervisor was agent Layla Jeffries, and that while on route, 
she authorized Boise police to conduct the search of the vehicle pending her arrival at the scene. 
It is undisputed that Ms. Jeffries was not the agent regularly assigned to the petitioner, but was 
dispatched by the on-duty supervisor because the petitioner's regular agent, Ms. Rhoda Faust, 
was attending a training program at the time. 
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Ms. Jeffries arrived at the scene after the search of the vehicle was begun, but before it 
was completed. She recalled seeing a duffel bag discovered by the police with what appeared to 
be stolen clothing in the trunk, but could not recall whether the trunk was open 'When she arrived. 
As a result of this discovery, Ms. Jeffries went with Boise police to the defendant's residence, 
and conducted a further search there. Ms. Jeffries did participate in this search, but concedes that 
Boise police did the majority of the searching while she remained with the petitioner. She further 
testified that in accordance with her usual practice in similar situations, she would have 
conducted the search of the petitioner's house whether the officers had suggested it or not 
Out of the preceding facts, the only significant conflicting testimony was between an 
officer of the Boise police, who believed that Ms. Jeffries requested the search to be started while 
she was on her way to the scene, and another officer who stated that the on-duty supervisor for 
the department of Probation and Parole had advised him that Boise police could search on behalf 
of the department while the supervisor arranged for a parole agent to come to the scene. 
As to the petitioner's claims that Ms. Comstock failed to file a direct appeal and a motion under 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 when asked to do so, the facts are not as clear. The petitioner states that 
he requested an appeal be filed. Ms. Comstock testified that she recalls no such request, and that 
given the absence of any notation in her file that such a request had been made, she did not 
believe it had been made. She further testified that had the petitioner clearly requested an appeal, 
her practice was to have the paralegal prepare the notice for filing immediately upon leaving the 
courtroom following sentencing, and that did not happen here. The defendant further stated that 
he tried to call Ms. Comstock several times to discuss an appeal with her, but could not get in 
touch with her. He admits, however, that he left no messages on these occasions. 
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TI.LEGAL STANDARDS 
A. PROCEEDINGS FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF. Owing to the civil nature 
of proceedings for post-conviction relief, the burden is on the petitioner to substmtiate bis or her 
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254,256, 869 P.2d 
571, 573 (Ct App. 1994). \Vb.ere a petition alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, mixed 
questions of fact and law are raised, and a trial court's factual findings will be upheld on review 
if supported by substantial evidence. Id Findings of law based upon said factual findings are 
reviewed de nova. Id 
B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. The issue of ineffective assistance 
of counsel is properly raised in a post-conviction setting. See Mathews, 839 P.2d 1215, 1219 
(citing Kraft v. State, 100 Idaho 671, 674, 603 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1979). To prevail on a claim of 
ineffective assistance, a petitioner must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's 
performance was adequate by demonstrating "that counsel's representation did not meet 
objective standards of competence." Roman, 125 Idaho at 648-49, 873 P.2d at 902-03. 
Claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated under the two-part test set 
. forth inStriddandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984). Under this test, the 
petitioner must not only demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, but must also 
show that the deficient performance was prejudicial. Id, 466 U.S. at 687-:-88, 104 S.Ct at 2064-
65. To establish deficient performance, the applicant must prove that counsel's representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. To prove prejudice, the applicant must 
show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. Id., at 694; Parrott, 117 Idaho at 27 4-75, 787 P .2d at 
260-62. This latter "prejudice" requirement focuses on whether counsel's ineffective 
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performance impacted the outcome of the case. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 
370-71 (1985); Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371,825 P.2d 94 (Ct.App.1992). In order to avoid 
summary dismissal, Petitioner must allege sufficient facts under both parts of the test Martinez 
V. State, 125 Idaho 844, 875 P.2d 941 (Ct. App. 1994). 
C. FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants 
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Similarly, Article I,§ 17 of the Constitution of the State ofidaho provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. 
Neither a search warrant nor probable cause is needed for the search of a probationer's 
home where such a search is conducted pursuant to a valid regulation that satisfies the Fourth 
Amendment's reasonableness standard by requiring reasonable grounds for a search, because a 
state's operation of a probation system presents "special needs" beyond normal law enforcement 
that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements. Probation, 
like incarceration, is a form of criminal sanction and a warrant or probable cause requirement 
would interfere with the supervisory relationship required for proper :functioning of the system. 
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164 (1987). 
In United States v. Shephard, 21 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled that the federal courts would look to state law to determine whether an arrest was 
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legal, in order to further determine if evidence discovered in a search incident to arrest should be 
suppressed. that case, Montana law required a deputy to obtain written authorization from a 
probation officer prior to the deputy arresting a probationer for a probation violation. Id. at 936. 
After obtaining verbal permission from the defendant's probation officer to arrest the defendant 
upon suspicion that he had violated his probation, the arrest was accomplished and the arresting 
deputy proceeded into the defendant's apartment to retrieve the defendant's wallet at the 
defendant's request. Id at 935. In the process of doing so, the deputy discovered a gun in plain 
view, the possession of which constituted a violation of the defendant's probation and also 
constituted the (federal) crime for which the defendant was convicted in the trial court. Id The 
Nmth Circuit suppressed the evidence and reversed the conviction even though verbal permission 
to arrest had been obtained, and the defendant was required to submit to warrantless searches as a 
term of his probation, because the law was clear that the authority to arrest for violations of 
probation had to be in writing, and the gun was found incident to the arrest, and not as the result 
of a search. Therefore, because the arrest was illegal all the fruits thereof, to include the gun 
found in plain view, should have been suppressed. Id That said, in dicta the Ninth Circuit 
indicated that if the issue was the legality of a search rather than an arrest followed by the 
discovery of contraband in plain view, the defendant's waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights as 
a condition of probation would have been relevant However, the issue was the legality of the 
arrest which resulted in the :finding of incriminating evidence; no "search" was conducted. Id. 
n.10. 
In US. v. Richardson, 849 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit made clear that the 
physical presence of a probation officer at the scene of a search conducted by the police in a case 
in which the probation officer had verbally authorized the search was not required, so long as the 
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probation officer was not merely acting as a "stalking horse" for the police. Tue Ninth Circuit 
stated: 
On balance we believe the Court approved the concept that the decision to 
authorize the search was more important than who was present when the search 
was made. Given the large case loads of most probation officers, requiring the 
probation officer's physical presence during every probation search or requiring 
close supervision of all probation searches would unnecessarily interfere Vl-rith the 
twin goals of probation: rehabilitation of the probationer and protection of society. 
Id. at 442. Tue Court also cited with approval the following language from United States v. 
Jarrard, 754 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1985): "Parole and law enforcement officials frequently 
cooperate in the course of their work. Parole officers often receive information concerning their 
parolees that is uncovered in police criminal investigations. Tue fact that police investigation of 
[a crime] ... preceded the involvement of parole officials does not in itself indicate that the search 
was initiated by police officers." Id. at 441. 
In an unpublished decision issued in 1995, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[a] probation 
officer is not a stalking horse ifhe, rather than the police, initiate[s] the search in the performance 
of his duties as a parole [or probation] officer. Officer Hook initiated each of the warrantless 
searches with the permission of her supervisor, and her reliance on the information provided by 
Detective Armstrong was proper. Officer Hook's request for police assistance to conduct the 
searches was proper. Lewis v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 68 F.3d 480 (9th Cir. 1995). 
The unique status of parolees vis a vis the Fourth Amendment was affirmed by the United 
States Supreme Court in the case of Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation v. Keith M Scott, 524 U.S. 
357, 118 S.Ct. 2014 (1998}. In that case, the Supreme Court held that in a parole revocation 
hearing, the exclusionary rule did not app]y to suppress evidence obtained in an illegal search 
which was used to prove the parolee's violation of parole, and which resulted in its revocation. 
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Although Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer dissented and described a probation revocation 
proceeding as "analogous" to a parole revocation hearing, it would appear that this ruling is 
limited to administrative actions by a parole board, and would not extend to a judicial proceeding 
before a trial court such as a probation revocation hearing. In any event, this Court believes a 
higher standard would be applied in probation revocation proceedings which, under Idaho law, 
are judicial and not administrative hearings. 
Regardless of particular suppression issues, in a broad~r context the United Sta!es 
Supreme Court has made clear that both probationers and parolees have a diminished expectation 
of privacy when it comes to Fourth Amendment search and seizure law. In United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S.Ct. 587 (2001), the Court upheld a provision in a California Court 
order providing that Knights was required to submit to a search at any time, ~ith or without a 
search or arrest warrant or reasonable cause, by any probation or law enforcement officer. The 
specific language of the condition quoted by the Court stated that Knights would "[s]ubmithis 
person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at any time, with or 
without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law 
enforcement officer." The Court pointed out that the language was unambiguous and that 
Knights had been unambiguously informed of the search condition when he signed his probation 
order, which further provided above his signature that "I HA VE RECEIVED A COPY, READ 
A.}.,'D UNDERSTAND THE ABOVE TERMS AND CONDIDONS OF PROBATION AND 
AGREE TO ABIDE BY THE SAME." Further, the Court was highly critical of the underlying 
Ninth Circuit decision which had found the search violative of the Fourth Amendment by citing 
to Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164 (1987). Of that decision the Supreme 
Court stated: "This dubious logic - that an opinion upholding the Constitutionality of a particular 
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search implicitly holds unconstitutional any search that is not like it - runs contrary to Griffin's 
express statement that its 'special needs' holding made it 'unnecessary to consider whether' 
warrantless searches of probationers were othervvise reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment" (Internal citations omitted). 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court declined to adopt the government's position that the 
defendant's acceptance of the condition was voluntary because he could have rejected probation 
and gone to prison if he wished, and that the waiver was analogous to many voluntary decision 
made by defendants in criminal cases, such as waiving the right to trial in the course of a plea 
bargain. Instead, the Court stated that ''we conclude the search of Knights was reasonable under 
our general Fourth Amendment approach of' examining the totality of the circumstances' with 
the probation search condition being a salient circumstance." (Internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted.) The Court then went on to state that '·[t]be touchstone of the Fourth Amendment 
is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined by 'assessing, on the one 
hand, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate government interests."' 
(Internal citations and quotations marks omitted.) The Court went on to hold that in assessing 
the degree to which Knights' privacy was intruded upon by the search at issue, "the probation 
order clearly expressed the search condition and Knights was unambiguously informed of it. The 
probation condition thus significantly diminished Knights' reasonable expectation of privacy." 
Further, the Court explained at length the govern.mental interests at stake: 
In assessing the governmental interest side of the balance, it must be remembered 
that "the very assumption of the institution of probation" is that the probationer 
"is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law." The recidivism rate 
of probationers is significantly higher than the general crime rate. See U.S. Dept 
of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of 
Felons on Probation, 1986-89, pp. 1, 6 (Feb.1992) (reporting that 43% of 79,000 
felons placed on probation in 17 States were rearrested for a felony within three 
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years while still on probation); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and Parole Violators in State Prison, 1991, 
p. 3 (Aug.1995) (stating that in 1991, 23% of state prisoners were probation 
violators). And probationers have even more of an incentive to conceal their 
criminal activities and quickly dispose of incriminating evidence than the ordinary 
criminal because probationers are aware that they may be subject to supervision 
and face revocation of probation, and possible incarceration, in proceedings in 
which the trial rights of a jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, among other 
things, do not apply .... 
The State has a dual concern with a probationer. On the one hand is the hope that 
he will successfully complete probation and be integrated back into the 
community. On the other is the concern, quite justified., that he will be more likely 
to engage in criminal conduct than an ordinary member of the community. The 
view of the Court of Appeals in this case would require the State to shut its eyes 
to the latter concern and concentrate only on the former. But we hold that the 
Fourth Amendment does not put the State to such a choice. Its interest in 
apprehending violators of the criminal law, thereby protecting potential victims of 
criminal enterprise, may therefore justifiably focus on probationers in a way that it 
does not on the ordinary citizen. 
Id. at 120-21 (internal citations omitted). The Court then balanced the factors it had considered: 
We hold that the balance of these considerations requires no more than reasonable 
suspicion to conduct a search of this probationer's house. The degree of 
individualized suspicion required of a search is a determination of when there is a 
sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct is occurring to make the 
intrusion on the individual's privacy interest reasonable. Although the Fourth 
Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability embodied in the term 
"probable cause," a lesser degree satisfies the Constitution when the balance of 
governmental and private interests makes such a standard reasonable. Those 
interests warrant a lesser than probable-cause standard here. When an officer has 
reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in 
criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that 
an intrusion on the probationer's significantly diminished privacy interests is 
reasonable. 
The same circumstances that lead us to conclude that reasonable suspicion is 
constitutionally sufficient also render a warrant requirement unnecessary. 
Id. at 121-22 (internal citations omitted). 
That said, the Court was unwilling to grant unfettered authority to the government to 
conduct warrantless searches of all probationers and parolees. In a footnote to the opinion, the 
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Court stated that "[w]e do not decide whether the probation condition so diminished, or 
completely eliminated, Knights' reasonable expectation of privacy (or constituted consent) that a 
search by a law enforcement officer without any individualized suspicion would have satisfied 
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment The terms of the probation condition 
permit such a search, but we need not address the constitutionality of a suspicionless search 
because the search in this case was supported by reasonable suspicion." Id. at 120 n.6. 
Clearly, Griffin v. Wisconsin does require an analysis oflocal law and regulations as well 
as probation or parole conditions actually imposed, and the defendant's knowledge of them, so as 
to balance the defendant's diminished expectation of privacy against the state's legitimate 
interest in maintaining the integrity of its parole and probation programs as required by Knights. 
It also seems clear that this Court must also consider the specific relationships between law 
enforcement officers and probation and parole agents and officers established under Idaho law, as 
was so clearly emphasized by the Ninth Circuit in Shephard, as part of the totality of the 
circumstances used to assess the reasonableness of the searches in the instant case consistent with 
Knights. 
D. SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF PROBATIONERS AND PAROLEES. Idaho 
certainly adheres to a policy that recognizes that probationers and parolees have fewer rights in 
the nature of procedural due process in revocation proceedings than would an individual accused 
of a crime in a new criminal proceeding. The Idaho Rules of Evidence provide that they do not 
apply to proceedings to grant or revoke probation. I.R.E. 101(7)(e)(3). Nor do they apply to 
prison administrative and disciplinary proceedings. Wolfe v. State, 114 Idaho 659, 759 P.2d 950 
(Ct App. 1988). 
The Idaho Constitution provides for state prisons and gives the state board of correction 
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"control, direction and management of ... adult felony probation and parole, with such 
compensation, powers and duties as may be prescribed by law." Idaho Const. art X, § 5. This 
provision has been interpreted by the Idaho Supreme Court to mean that the board of correction, 
acting through powers delegated by it to the Commission on Pardons and Parole, is not an agency 
within the meaning of the Administrative Procedures Act, and section 67-5215, Idaho Code, is 
inapplicable to a parole decision by the Commission of Pardons and Parole. Carman v. State 
Comm 'n of Pardons and Parole, 119 Idaho 642, 809 P.2d 503 (1991). 
Rules 6.01.01.701 and 702 of the Idaho Administrative Code provide as follows: 
01. Search Of Home, Vehicle And Property. Any person who resides with an 
offender under the supervision of the Department while on probation or parole or 
an offender released on furlough shall have the person's home, vehicle and 
property, both personal and real, subject to search by a probation and parole 
officer at reasonable times and in a reasonable manner to [sic] extent that the 
home, vehicle and property are accessible to the offender. The officer shall not 
need a warrant, reasonable suspicion, or probable cause. ( 11-5-99) 
02. Visits At Place Of Employment. Any person who employs an offender under 
the supervision of the Department while on probation or parole, an offender 
housed in a community work center, or an offender rel~ased on furlough shall 
have the offender's designated work areas subject to inspection by a probation and 
parole officer at reasonable times and in a reasonable manner. The officer shall 
not need a warrant, reasonable suspicion, or probable cause. (11-5-99) 
Clearly, Idaho's policy as to searches of probationers or parolees is to exercise the 
broadest legal authority possible to allow warrantless searches of parolees and probationers, and 
of their residences, vehicles, property andjobsites, in order to assure the integrity of the state's 
probation and parole programs. Section 20-227, Idaho Code, provides that a probation or parole 
officer may arrest a parolee or probationer or may, in a writing described as an agent's warrant, 
deputize any other officer with the same power to arrest without a warrant for violations of the 
conditions of parole or probation. The warrant must state why the probation or parole officer 
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believes, his judgment, that the supervised person has violated his conditions of probation or 
parole. However, this Court knows of no provision oflaw or regulation of the Board of 
Correction or Commission of Pardons and Parole purporting to require a similar writing to enable 
one deputized with the power to arrest for suspected violations of probation or parole to conduct 
a search of the parolee or his property. That said, Idaho requires conditions of probation to be in 
writing and to be given to the parolee. LC.§ 20-228. As to probation, it is the Court which has 
the authority to suspend sentence and place the defendant on probation "under such terms and 
conditions as it deems necessary and expedient" I.C. § 19-2601(2). 
The Board of Correction is responsible for enforcing the observance of rules and 
regulations for parole or probation as established by the commission for pardons and parole or 
the courts. LC. § 20-216. It is also charged with the duty of supervising all persons convicted of 
a felony, placed on probation, or released on parole, and of reporting alleged violations to the 
commission or the courts and to aid in determining whether the probation or parole should be 
continued or revoked. LC. § 20-219. 
Idaho has gone to some lengths to train probation and parole officers as professional law 
enforcement personnel, and to make clear that they are peace officers as well as probation and 
parole officers. They can function in both capacities. The fact that they operate in this dual 
capacity is not materially different than the fact that a traffic officer whose main function is 
traffic enforcement may also be called to arrest a shoplifter or armed robber, or a homicide 
detective may be called upon to pull over an intoxicated driver. These dual functions are not 
unique, but are common, especially -where tight budgets and reduced personnel require them. 
Section 19-5101(c), Idaho Code, defines "law enforcement" as "any and all activities 
pertaining to crime prevention or reduction and law enforcement, including police, courts, 
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prosecution, corrections, probation, rehabilitation, and juvenile delinquency." Section 19-
5101 ( d), Idaho Code, defines "peace officer" in pertinent part as "any employee of a police or 
law enforcement agency which is a part of or administered by the state or any political 
subdivision thereof and whose duties include and primarily consist of the preyention and 
detection of crime and the enforcement of penal, traffic or highway laws of this state or any 
political subdivision." Pursuant to section 19-5102(g), Idaho Code, the peace officer standards 
and training council includes in its membership "the director of the department of correction or 
his designee." Section 19-51 0A, Idaho Code, delegates the powers of a law enforcement officer 
to all employees of the state board of correction who receive certification from the Idaho peace 
officers standards and training council and also extends those powers to employees designated by 
the board of correction pursuant to section 20-209C when such employees are engaged in 
arresting persons who are suspected of having violated the terms and conditions of their 
probation, or when present with and at the request oflocal, state, or federal law enforcement 
officers. 
When acting to enforce the terms and conditions of probation, whether alone or in 
conjunction with other law enforcement officers, it is clear that probation and parole officers are 
clearly law enforcement officers under Idaho law. Thus, any distinction claimed to exist between 
"police officers" and "probation officers" when dealing with suspected violations of probation or 
parole, based upon the primary classification of the officer and their unique and broadly-
separated roles in other contexts, ignores the clear provisions ofldaho's constitutional and 
statutory :framework. Clearly, the Idaho Supreme Court has had no difficulty in upholding the 
warrantless search of a probationer where a knowing waiver of Fourth Amendment rights has 
been executed by the probationer. State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 736 P.2d 1295 (1987). In 
Order re: Evidcntimy Hearing held May 1, 2013 16 
Gawron, the language of the waiver was broad: "That probationer does hereby agree and consent 
to the search of his person, automobile, real property, and any other property at any time and at 
any place by any law enforcement officer, peace officer or probation officer, and does waive his 
constitutional right to be free from such searches." Id. at 842, 736 P.2d at 1296. The Idaho 
Supreme Court drew no distinction between the rights of probation or parole officers and the 
rights of peace officers or law enforcement officers to conduct such a search. 
In Gawron a Boise police officer (detective) found pawn tickets implicating Gawron in 
certain thefts. The detective noted that Gawron was on probation. He called the office of 
probation and parole and spoke to a supervisor about his suspicions. The supervisor agreed that 
a search of Gawron' s residence was justified and the detective and the supervisor conducted the 
search, finding incriminating evidence. The Idaho Supreme Court stated that "if a defendant 
considers the conditions of probation too harsh, he has the right to refuse probation and undergo 
the sentence. If such a defendant desires to challenge the legality of any proposed conditions of 
probation, he may do so on appeal from the judgment, or on habeas corpus." Id. at 843, 736 P.2d 
at 1297. The Court used the following language to uphold the reasonableness of such searches: 
"[W]e hold that such persons conditionally released to societies have c;1 reduced expectation of 
privacy, thereby rendering intrusions by government authorities 'reasonable' which otherwise 
would be unreasonable or invalid under traditional constitutional concepts." Id 
ID.ANALYSIS 
A. COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO SEEK SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE DOES 
NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. The Court finds the 
testimony of the police officers and the probation officer involved in these two searches to be 
credible. The police officers had a reasonable basis to believe that the petitioner was involved in 
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the illegal activity of burglary and theft from Fred Meyer stores based upon the statements made 
to them by the loss prevention manager. Even without such a reasonable basis, the stop of the 
petitioner's vehicle was appropriate since he had violated a traffic law due to the "California 
stop" observed by the officer. Further, the officer observed in plain view in the vehicle a piece of 
high end athletic clothing that appeared brand new, consistent with the loss prevention manager's 
beliefs that the petitioner was involved in the thefts of precisely this type of merchandise. 
The Court further finds that after checking the petitioner's status and finding that he was 
on parole, it was appropriate for the officer to call the on-duty probation and parole supervisor 
and advise him of his concerns and suspicions, and it was appropriate for the probation 
supervisor to dispatch the nearest available parole officer to the scene and to give verbal 
authority to search pursuant to the terms of the petitioner's probation. The Court finds that the 
supervisor and the probation officer (Ms. Jeffries) were not "stalking horses" for a police 
investigation but had legitimate concerns regarding the petitioner's conduct on probation. 
Further, the Court finds that given the authority granted to them by the supervisor and taking into 
account all the surrounding circumstances, the police were acting as "agents" of Field and 
Community Services pursuant to the search condition in the petitioner's parole agreement, of 
which he was fully aware. 
Moreover, it is irrelevant to the propriety of the vehicle search that the search was 
commenced by police prior to the probation officer's arrival on the scene. Neither federal nor 
Idaho law requires the probation officer to be physically present before a warrantless search 
commenced pursuant to a probationer's Fourth Amendment waiver and at the direction of the 
Department of Probation and Parole may be undertaken by police. While condition eight of the 
petitioner's parole agreement refers only to agents of Field and Community Servic.es, the term 
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"agent'' is undefined and, in view of the Idaho authorities set forth above, the Court believes it 
should be read to allow law enforcement personnel acting on the authority of Field and 
Community Services to conduct the searches contemplated by that condition, as was the case 
here. Idaho law requires terms not defined to be given their everyday meaning as commonly 
understood. LC. § 73-113; State v. Morris, 28 Idaho 599, 155 P. 296 (1916). 
As to the search of the petitioner's home, the Court finds that the discovery of clothing 
items in the trunk of the petitioner's vehicle with price tags still attached supplies ample basis for 
the warrantless search under federal and Idaho law, as well as the parole agreement, as set forth 
previously. Tbis search fully meets the requirements of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution and of Article 17 of the Idaho constitution as construed by the U.S. and Idaho 
Supreme Courts. 
In the alternative to the above, as to the search of the petitioner's vehicle, the Court finds 
that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause that the 
petitioner had violated traffic laws, and upon seeing apparel in plain view inside the vehicle 
consistent with information provided to police by Fred Meyer, police had reasonable suspicion 
and/or probable cause to search the rest of the vehicle for further evidence consistent with the 
reported thefts irrespective of the petitioner's Fourth Amendment waiver under the "automobile 
exception" to the search warrant requirement. State v. Veneroso, 138 Idaho 925, 929, 71 P.3d 
1072, 1076 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894,898, 821 P.2d 949,953 (1991). 
\Vhile the automobile exception obviously cannot be used to validate the warrantless search of 
the petitioner's home, it is undisputed that at that search a probation officer was physically 
present from the beginning, and actively participated in the search. Therefore, there is no 
question that the warrantless search of the petitioner's home was validly undertaken pursuant to 
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the petitioner's Fourth Amendment waiver even if a search warrant would otherwise have been 
required. 
Having made these findings, the Court also finds that Ms. Comstock did not render 
ineffective assistance to the petitioner when she failed to seek suppression of the evidence 
discovered in each of the searches in issue, for the evidence here was properly obtained. 
Accordingly, there was no "fruit of the poisonous tree" to suppress; in fact, there was not even a 
poisonous tree, and any such motion was doomed to failure for the reasons specified above. 
Therefore, it was neither incompetent for Ms. Comstock to forego filing the motion nor 
prejudicial to the petitioner that she failed to do so, and the corresponding claim in the petition 
fails on the merits. Hassettv. State, 127 Idaho 313,316,900 P.2d 221,224 (Ct. App. 1995). 
The Court emphasizes that even assuming, for the sake of argument, that a motion to suppress 
should have been filed, the second leg of the Strickland analysis is not met, for there was no 
prejudice to the defendant. 
B. COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO FILE A DIRECT APPEAL OF THE JUDGMENT 
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. As both 
counsel acknowledged at the hearing, the petitioner's claim that he unequivocally informed 
counsel at the sentencing hearing of his desire to appeal cannot be reconciled with Ms. 
Comstock's testimony that if such a request had been unequivocally made, she would have made 
a note of it in the petitioner's file and the appeal would have been noticed that very day, in 
accordance with her typical practice. Therefore, this Court is required to determine, from this 
conflicting testimony, whether in fact an unequivocal request was made.3 This is the sole issue 
3 The parties concede that if an equivocal inquiry concerning an appeal were made, but 
not clarified to the point of certainty, it would not be ineffective assistance for 
counsel to neglect to pursue the issue further or to file an appeal upon her best 
guess concerning her client's wishes. 
Order re: Evidentiary Hearing held May l, 2013 20 
as to this claim because the parties agree.that if an unequivocal request was made, and the appeal 
was not timely filed, the loss of the opportunity to appeal constitutes ineffective assistance of 
counsel without the need for further evidence. 
The Court finds, based on the testimony provided at the hearing, that an unequivocal 
request was not made by the petitioner, or, if one was attempted, the attempt fell short of the 
efforts a reasonab.le person in the.petitioner's position would have made in order to ensure that 
his wishes were known. The petitioner's testimony is that he made the request at the sentencing 
hearing, but he could not say with any certainty whether Ms. Comstock actually heard and 
understood him, since the request was likely made in haste as the next case was being called 
(perhaps while the petitioner was being taken into custody) rather than in conference with Ms. 
Comstock or under similar circumstances. That the petitioner had some doubts as to whether 
Ms. Comstock was aware that he wished to appeal is reflected in the fact that the petitioner called 
the office of the public defender on several occasions after he was sentenced to check on his case. 
Unfortunately, on each such occasion Ms. Comstock could not immediately answer the phone 
and, critically, the petitioner on each occasion chose not to leave any message. A reasonable 
person, wishing to appeal the judgment of conviction in his case, and knowing that he had not 
had an adequate opportunity to clearly apprise his attorney of his ·wishes, would not have 
contented himself with speaking to the "front desk" of the public defender's office and declining 
the invitation to leave a message. The petitioner admits that he left no messages, and this Court 
finds that this admission bolsters Ms. Comstock' s testimony that no request was made ( or at least 
heard), especially given that the petitioner's testimony concerning the rushed circumstances in 
which he allegedly made the request also supports Ms. Comstock' s testimony that if such a 
request had been made, she did not become aware of it. 
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Further, the Court has been given no reason to doubt Ms. Comstock's testimony that had 
she been made aware of the petitioner's wishes, there would be documentary evidence in the 
petitioner's file with the public defender's office. Of course, this Court is not blind to the 
possibility that an absence of such evidence could easily be fabricated to avoid a charge of 
incompetent representation, but finds no reason to suspect such conduct here, where the only 
consequence of a simple ad.mission by Ms. Comstock that she forgot to file the appeal would be 
the reinstatement of the petitioner's ability to appeal. In short, after considering all the relevant 
evidence, the Court credits Ms. Comstock's testimony that the petitioner never made his desire to 
appeal unequivocally known, and further finds her testimony to be the more credible. 
Accordingly, her failure to timely file a notice of appeal did not constitute ineffective assistance 
of counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds in favor of the respondent on all the claims 
raised in the petition. A separate judgment will be filed reflecting the Court's decision in this 
matter. 
SO ORDERED and dated this~ay of May, 2013. 
~ Distri Judge 
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